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We develop an extension to differential equation models of dynamical systems
to allow us to analyze probabilistic threshold dynamics that fundamentally
and globally change system behavior. We apply our novel modeling approach
to two cases of interest: a model of infectious disease modified for malware
where a detection event drastically changes dynamics by introducing a new
class in competition with the original infection; and the Lanchester model
of armed conflict, where the loss of a key capability drastically changes the
effectiveness of one of the sides. We derive and demonstrate a step-by-step,
repeatable method for applying our novel modeling approach to an arbitrary
system, and we compare the resulting differential equations to simulations
of the system’s random progression. Our work leads to a simple and easily
implemented method for analyzing probabilistic threshold dynamics using
differential equations.
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1. Introduction
Differential equation models have wide applicability in the study of dy-
namic systems. They are attractive because they are numerically fast and
tractable, transparent in the sense that it is easy to understand how the
inputs directly relate to the outputs, and frequently have special cases for
which closed-form solutions exist. Our research adapts these models to in-
clude systems with stochastic, sharp thresholds. One example of a system
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with a sharp threshold is a computer network where malicious code is intro-
duced, subject to probabilistic detection and subsequent eradication. In this
system, one instant the malicious code is undiscovered, and the following
instant it is discovered; discovery defines the sharp threshold and changes
system dynamics by allowing a remedy to be applied. For this and many
other system, ‘half-thresholds’, such as “half discovered” are not physically
realizable as they do not refer to any realizable state of the system.
A sharp threshold may also be seen in armed conflict where loss of a key
capability fundamentally changes the capability of one or both sides.This
may be thought of as loss of a key platform or capability. Statements such as
“half attrited” do not refer to a realizable state of the system while statements
about the probability distribution of a given system surviving are meaningful.
The current method of handling dynamical systems with sharp thresholds
is to appeal to simulation of the threshold event by simulating the entire
system’s random progression. This is useful because it is easily understood,
but is expensive, both in terms of computation and time. Often, many
simulation repetitions are required to analyze the average behavior of the
system and gain useful insights.
It seems that the threshold process and the differential equation model
are irreconcilable, chiefly because the threshold event is not divisible in the
sense that its expected state is generally not reachable. Our contribution is
to overcome this difficulty in a way that has not been previously shown by
applying a mean field approximation to the threshold process. By doing so,
we create differential equation models that capture the average performance
of systems with probabilistic threshold dynamics.
Our approach is novel in that we incorporate the distribution of the
threshold time, which may be dependent on the dynamic system state, to
create a representation of the average value of the thresholded process. Our
method produces a time-trace of the expected state of the system, as well as
an explicitly time-dependent, cumulative distribution of the threshold time.
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The advantages to be had are numerous. First, by creating a differential
equation model, we are able to verify simulation models by comparing them
against derived or numerical results. Second, we may use the fast, cheap,
differential equation model to scope complex, expensive simulations. Addi-
tionally, as a by-product, the model produces the time-dependent cumulative
distribution of the threshold time, which prior to modeling may be expressed
in terms of the dynamic system state and therefore may not have explicit
time dependence. Finally, after developing the theory, we provide two worked
examples, along with a step-by-step tutorial on how to apply this method to
any thresholded system with a differential equation model.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we review the
applicable literature. In Section 3, we derive our novel methodology by devel-
oping a mean-field approximation for spreading malware among a computer
network, and extract the step-by-step procedure for applying it to other
systems. In Section 4, we apply the step-by-step procedure to the Lanch-
ester model of armed conflict. In Section 5, we provide numerical examples
comparing the differential equation models to simulations. In Section 5, we
also demonstrate that the differential equations from our novel methodology
are fundamentally different from differential equations for a non-thresholded
system; in other words, no choice of parameters of the non-thresholded dif-
ferential equations may replicate the behavior of the thresholded differential
equations. Finally, in Section 6, we provide some discussion of and directions
for future research.
2. Literature Review
The general theory and application of differential equation models for
physical and social phenomena is a common topic that spans several dis-
ciplines, including applied mathematics, biology, and operations research.
Many good overviews of the topic exist; for a general text, we recommend
Differential Equation Models by Braun et al. [8]. For an overview of basic
analysis and solution techniques, we recommend O’Neil [34]. Mean-field ap-
proximations are frequently used in physics; for an in-depth overview, see
the second chapter of Freericks [15]. An overview of approximation methods
for probabilistic methods is given by Darling et al. [11].
Mean-field models of epidemics have a long history, and are covered in
detail in Daley and Gani [10] (see also Andersson and Britton [2], Anderson
and May [1]). For a short overview, we recommend the recent tutorial by
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Dimitrov and Meyers [12]. Fitting models to data is addressed by Mollison
[30], and stochastic epidemics are reviewed in detail by Andersson and Brit-
ton [2]. Specific system behaviors related to our research, such as time of
discovery thresholds, are addressed by Metz et al. [29]. The distribution of
the number of infected individuals at the moment of first detection is studied
by Trapman and Bootsma [37].
The application of infectious disease models to computer infections has
been recommended by JASON. [20], an independent group of scientists ad-
vising the United States government. A related and noteworthy reference is
the case study of the Code Red worm by Moore et al. [31]. Epidemics on
networks, and particularly the S − I − R model is studied by Draief et al.
[13], and the implications of several theoretical network topologies are exam-
ined. The spread of malware on wireless networks is considered by Hu et al.
[19]. This paper examines the performance of malware - and the steps taken
to prevent it - on representative topologies for 7 urban ares in the United
States.
The work most closely related to our application in malware infections is
Vojnovic and Ganesh [38]. Their model closely matches the dynamics of ours
in that machines may be in two competing states—infected or patched—and
the system operator wishes to maximize the number of patched machines.
Our work differs from theirs because, in our model, the detection event occurs
as a function of the infection process.
Two recent books by Newman [32, 33] describe the formulation and anal-
ysis of network models and include cases of epidemics spread on networks
as well as the general theory of mean-field approximations. For the specific
application of computer infection, our work is different in that we consider
both epidemic detection and spread simultaneously in a single, integrated
set of differential equations that track the whole progression of the epidemic.
Epidemics on networks are also considered in Keeling and Eames [22], where
the force of infection changes as a function of time. Keeling and Eames [22]
bears some similarity to the Lanchester example we use in this manuscript–
in which an equation parameter changes after a certain random threshold
event–however, the methods we develop address general changes in dynamics,
beyond parameter changes. In Section 3.4, we describe a general, step-by-
step method in which system dynamics can change arbitrarily as a function
of a threshold event. For example, we could study a system where one set of
machines, I, infect another set of machines , S, then based on some random
event that itself depends on the numbers of I and S machines the dynamics
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switch and now S machines infect I machines. This extreme example illus-
trates the broad applicability and potential of our methodology, in that it
can handle whole-sale changes of the entire system, where the timing of the
change itself is dependent on the system state.
Mean-field models have been applied in epidemic models of network in-
fections byLelarge and Bolot [27], and a development of their applicability to
general infectious disease models is given in Kleczkowski and Grenfell [24],
who justify the use of the mean-field approximation for sufficiently large,
non-homogeneous networks. Aparicio and Pascual [4] describe the mean-
field approach and demonstrate specific cases where it diverges from more
sophisticated methods. Essentially, mean field, also called “compartmental”
or “mass action” models assume homogeneous mixing. In large networks this
may be unsatisfactory because it ignores the dynamic that individuals tend to
interact more with those who are close to them than those who are far away.
This dynamic is further complicated by considering epidemics on information
systems, where the network topology may have little correlation with physi-
cal topology. Keeling [21] develops a correction to the basic S-I-R model by
replacing the stationary infectivity parameter,β with a non-stationary β(t),
which captures the effect of faster transmission in the beginning stages of
infection and slower transmission at the end of the epidemic. Keeling and
Eames [22] also addresses the applicability of mean-field models to network
epidemic transmission. Though, the focus of this work is a general proce-
dure of creating mean-field models as opposed to the specific application of
mean-field models to networks.
Infections with multiple stages are considered by Gani [16]. Their ap-
proach partitions the infective population into two sub-populations; a suscep-
tible individual becomes fully part of the infective class after having contact
with both the first- stage and second-stage of the infection.
Multiple Stages are also developed by Chowell [9]. These approaches in-
crease the partitioning of the model or generalize the distribution time in each
partition but do treat the threshold as global. Finkelstein [14] also studies
epidemics with multiple stages. They share our approach of making the first
stage of their model the unencumbered, or basic S−I−R model. The second
stage they consider measures the cost associated with the epidemic. These
two stages are analyzed iteratively to determine the amount of prophylactic
vaccination that minimizes the epidemics’ impact -from a cost perspective.
Aggressive prophylactic measures, such as vaccination in biological epidemics
are considered by House and Keeling [18]. The problem of determining the
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correct amount of preventative measure is similar to our problem of patch
dissemination in a malware context.
Another perspective on multiple stage epidemics is provided by Klepac
[25]. Here, feedback exists between the infective process and the ‘demo-
graphic’ process - which consists of immigration and birth. Their approach
includes processes that work on different time scales operating in the same
model; their overall development measures density-dependent disease trans-
mission. Conversely, our development focuses on the global, uniform change
in dynamics created by discovery of malware, or loss of a critical combat
enabler. Our threshold may be explicitly dependent on time or implicitly
dependent on the other state variables. Furthermore, we extend our model
approach beyond epidemics to general dynamic systems, using the Lanchester
model of aimed fire as an example. It is possible that for specific scenarios,
Kelpac and Caswell’s model produces similar results.
For differential equation combat models, we recommend the original pa-
per by Lanchester [26]. A model applying these equations to the Ardennes
campaign is in Bracken and Rosenthal [7]. Combat models with a single,
deterministic threshold are studied by Schramm [35].
Our method differs from these examples because we treat it as global in
the sense that the threshold affects all entities in the model, regardless of
their status, by changing the interaction rules. While this could be done in
a naive way by specifying the time of transition, and using the final state of
the first model as the initial conditions for the second, we choose to do so in
a way that respects the stochasticity of the threshold event, delivering the
expected value of the modeled process under the stochastic threshold. As we
demonstrate in the Appendix, our method captures dynamics that are not
present in the unthresholded systems, driving home the point that one could
not simply choose the correct parameters of the naive system to satisfactorily
achieve the same output.
3. Modeling Sharp Thresholds
In this section, we describe a basic discrete-time, discrete-state system
that models the spread of a cyber infection (henceforth, malware). We use
mean-field approximations to derive our novel methodology. Finally, in Sec-
tion 3.4, we step back from our example to derive a general, step-by-step
process for repeating the derivation in other systems.
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3.1. Markovian Discrete-Time Dynamics
We begin by considering a model of the spread of malware in a finite
population of machines in discrete time. For ease of exposition, we use the
term malware loosely to describe all malicious code that spreads via inter-
machine contact, to include worms, viruses, etc. Similarly, we use the term
infected to mean that a machine has malware somewhere in its operating
system.
We begin with a few basic definitions to facilitate the exposition. There
is a fixed population of N machines. At any time, a machine may be in one
of the following three states:
Class S: a machine is susceptible, in class S, if it is not currently infected,
but may become infected if it interacts with an infected machine.
Class I : a machine is infected, in class I, if it is currently infected and may
spread the infection by interaction with a machine of class S.
Class R : a machine is removed, in class R, if it is currently not infected
and is immune to infection. A machine may join class R from either
class S or I by having a patch installed.
As a preventive measure, a system administrator may specifically design
or designate m machines as sentinels, which are monitored for infection.
Malware may only be detected when it infects a sentinel. After detection,
anti-malware measures, which we collectively refer to as patches, may be
developed and distributed.
Our model has two linked processes–predetection spread and postdetec-
tion spread–linked by a detection event. Next, we describe a discrete-time,
discrete-state mathematical model of infection progression for each process
and the detection event.
By the term discrete-state system, we are referring specifically to the
Markov population model of the system. The Markov population model, de-









t ) ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}5. Initially the last three coordinates of
the Markov state are 0, because detection has not yet occurred. The process
proceeds in a Markovian fashion until detection occurs, itself a Markovian
event, at which point the first two coordinates of the state become 0 and
Markovian transitions affect the last three coordinates.
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3.1.1. Predetection Process
In this section, we describe the discrete-time, discrete-state infection pro-
cess before detection, which is a standard S-I model of infectious diseases
(see Daley and Gani [10]). We denote the number of predetection infected
machines in round t with IPt , and predetection susceptible machines in round
t with SPt . Spread starts at t = 0 with I0 infected machines and S0 susceptible
machines.
The predetection discrete-time infection process proceeds in rounds. Dur-
ing each round, each machine in class IP selects a partner machine from the
population, uniformly at random, for interaction. If the partner machine is
of class IP , no changes occur. If the partner machine is of class SP , the
partner machine transitions from SP to IP with probability β. The number







forms a Markov chain. We write the conditional expectation of
each coordinate in round t+ 1 in terms of the coordinates in round t as:
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Equation (2) states that the expected number infecteds in round t+ 1 is the
number of infecteds in round t plus the expected number of newly created
infecteds, IPt · SPt · βN . Similar reasoning gives the first equation. The expec-
tation expressions are an approximation, assuming a large population size,
N , I small relative to N , so that the likelihood of two infected machines
choosing the same susceptible machine is negligible.
3.1.2. Postdetection Process
In this section, we describe the infection process after detection has oc-
curred, which is similar to the classic S-I-R model (see Daley and Gani [10]).
When detection occurs, a patch is distributed to all machines in the popula-
tion: this is a piece of code that, if installed, removes any existing infection
and makes the machine(s) resistant to any future infections. Each machine
adopts the patch independently with probability µ in each round. We denote
postdetection infecteds in round t by IDt , postdetection susceptibles in round
t by SDt , and postdetection removeds in round t by R
D
t .
Postdetection dynamics begin immediately after detection. During the
round of detection, t∗, infected members of the population remain infected;
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i.e., IDt∗ = I
P
t∗ . The malware continues to spread; the expected number of
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variables. Assuming that detection has occurred in
round t∗ ≤ t, their expectations in round t+ 1 are:
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The above equations are nearly identical to the classic S-I-R model, except
that they include patch installation, a transition from S to R. Like the
Lanchester equations discussed in the next Section, the above expectations
are not exact. For example, it is possible for the first equation to produce
negative values when µ and β are close to one. This is because the equation
is based on a simplification and does not account for the fact that a machine
can only do one of apply the patch or be infected in a single round. None
the less, this is a standard simplification in mean-field models, for example
it is used for natural birth and death in S-I-R models [23]. Substituting the
correct expression for the expectation on the right hand side would be more
accurate, but result in more complex formulas in the subsequent differential
equations. The variables never go negative when we transition to continuous
time because β and µ are then interpreted as rates.
3.1.3. The Detection Event
We are now ready to consider the detection event probabilistically, which
is our main contribution. During each round, the m sentinels have the oppor-
tunity to contract and detect the malware. We assume that the m sentinels
are reselected in a uniform random manner from the population of N ma-
chines in each round; this simplifies the model by removing the necessity
to track the number of infected sentinels. Detection at an infected sentinel
occurs probabilistically. Let α be the probability that a single infected sen-
tinel does not detect the malware in a single time period. This choice of
parameterization will prove useful in the following development. Let Dt be




1 if detection has occurred by time t
0 otherwise.
Consider the sequence of differences, Dt−Dt−1. Members of this sequence
are equal to zero everywhere, except in the round of detection. For the round
of detection, when t equals t∗, the difference is equal to one. We write the
expectation of this difference as
E[Dt −Dt−1] = Pr[Dt−1 = 0] · E [Dt −Dt−1 | Dt−1 = 0]
+ Pr[Dt−1 = 1] · E [Dt −Dt−1 | Dt−1 = 1] . (3)
The second term in Equation (3) is equal to zero because if detection occurred
by round t − 1, it has also occurred by round t. Because the difference
expression is nonzero only if detection occurs in round t, we can rewrite the
first term in the expression as
Pr[Dt−1 = 0] · E [Dt −Dt−1 | Dt−1 = 0] = Pr[Dt = 1, Dt−1 = 0]. (4)
The right-hand side of Equation (4) expresses the probability that detection
occurs on round t and has not occurred in rounds 1 through t − 1. Given
IPi , the probability that detection occurs in round i is 1−αIPi m/N , where the
exponent comes from computing the expected number of infected sentinel
machines if sentinel machines are chosen uniformly from the population. Let
IPt:0 denote the sequence I
P
t , . . . , I
P
0 . From Equations (3) and (4), we have







k m/N , (5)
which is the fundamental difference equation for the D event in this example.
3.2. Coupling the Postdetection and Predetection Processes
The key to properly modeling the sharp change in infection dynamics is
the coupling of the predetection process and the postdetection process, as
governed by the random detection event. In the round of detection, it is
necessary to move all machines from the predetection dynamics to the new
postdetection dynamics. For a graphical depiction of coupling, see Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Depiction of Coupling. In the round of detection, which we call t∗, the state of
the predetection process is transferred to the postdetection process.
Let (St, It) be a Markov chain that evolves as an undetected predetection
process for all t. Using the notation in the previous sections for predetection




Intuitively, the above expressions say that before detection has occurred—
when Dt is 0—the predetection process evolves as specified in Section 3.1.1;
and after detection has occurred—when Dt is 1—there are no machines in
the SP and IP classes. For brevity, let











denote the state of a Markov chain describing evolution of the cyber infection.
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Intuitively, these say that in the round when detection occurs—the only
time that Dt − Dt−1 is 1— a sudden inflow of of machines, equal to the
machines in the undetected I and S classes, comes into the postdetection
classes. Afterward, the postdetection classes behave as described in Section
3.1.2. This allows us to write the complete discrete time difference equations,
E [St+1 | At]− St = −βStIt
N
(6a)
E [It+1 | At]− It = βStIt
N
(6b)











SPt = (1−Dt)St (6d)












]−RDt = µ (IDt + SDt ) . (6h)
The superscript of D is IP instead of I because the difference E[Dt+1 |
IPt:0] − E[Dt | IPt:0] is zero after detection occurs. As written, after detection,
IP is zero, and the difference E[Dt+1 | IPt:0]−E[Dt | IPt:0] is zero. If I were used,
the difference would never be zero because the I process is not affected by
detection, and asymptotically approaches the total population as t increases.
3.3. Moving to Continuous Time
To move to continuous time from the unit time, discrete difference equa-
tions, (6a)–(6h), we create a sequence of random processes, each evaluated
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at an arbitrarily small time interval, ∆t. In each of these processes, we scale
the parameters β, µ, and α so as to keep the expected number of events per
unit time constant; in continuous time µ and β are properly interpreted as
rates and are no longer restricted to the interval [0, 1].
The parameter β gives the expected number of new infections per infected
machine per unit time if all other machines are susceptible. For a process
that proceeds in time intervals of ∆t, the parameter should be scaled to ∆tβ
because the faster-moving process has 1
∆t
attempts at infection per unit time.
Similar reasoning shows that the parameter µ should be scaled to ∆tµ.
The correct scaling for the parameter α is more delicate. In the unit time
progression process, a single infected sentinel does not detect the infection
with probability α in each round. The scaling of the parameter should be
such that the probability an infected sentinel does not detect the infection
remains α for a unit of time. Let α∆ denote the scaled parameter. The
property we seek is α
1
∆t




at detection during a unit time step. Preserving the desired property gives
us a scaling of α∆ = e
∆t ln(α) .
The next step of the derivation involves the mean-field assumption, which
equates a random variable to its expectation. In general, this step is contro-
versial because it is a heuristic argument, in the sense that it is not explicitly
predicated on taking limits of random processes using tools like the func-
tional central limit theorem Billingsley [6], Andersson and Djehiche [3]. On
the other hand, it is possible to rigorously derive convergence results based
on these heuristic approaches, at the cost of a significant increase in math-
ematical complexity McNeil and Schach [28]. It is even possible to derive
results on the variance of the stochastic process from the means described by
the differential equations [5]. Practically, many researchers jump directly to
the differential equation models, without considering the underlying Markov
chain at all [23, 32]. We are explicit in the heuristic limiting argument, with-
out predication on functional central limit theorem, and numerically check
the accuracy of the resulting differential equation against a simulation of the
Markov chain in Section 5.
With appropriately scaled parameters, we begin with the discrete time
difference equations for a process moving in time steps of ∆t, apply the
mean-field assumption equating a random variable to its expectation, and
take the limit as ∆t approaches zero to derive the continuous time differential
equations. We can follow these steps for each of the Equations (6a)–(6h),
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but for exposition we give a few examples highlighting the important details.
For Equation (6a), the process moving at ∆t time intervals has the equa-
tion
E [St+∆t | At]− St = −∆tβStIt
N
.












which is the final continuous time equation for the S class. The equation for
the I class can be derived similarly.
Deriving the continuous time equation for D is slightly more involved,
but consists of the same set of steps. First, we begin with the difference
equation for a process moving at ∆t time intervals,
E[Dt+∆t | IPt:0]− E[Dt | IPt:0] =
(






Applying mean-field, dividing both sides by ∆t, and taking the limit as ∆t




























































which gives the final continuous time equation for the D variable.
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To finish deriving the continuous time system, Equations (6d) and (6e)
directly translate into their continuous time equivalents.
SP (t) = (1−D(t))S(t)
IP (t) = (1−D(t))I(t).
However, for the purposes of a uniform presentation, it may be desirable to














Finally, Equations (6f)–(6h) can be converted into continuous equivalents
through the standard route of applying the mean-field approximation and


























































where we have dropped the explicit dependence on t for brevity. The initial
conditions for these equations place the starting number of infected machines
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in I(0) and IP (0), the starting number of susceptible machines in S(0) and
SP (0), and set the start of all other variables to zero. By definition 0 ≤ α ≤ 1;
the RHS of equation (7c) will always be positive.
3.4. Discussion
To gain some understanding of Equations (7a)–(7h), we discuss their
intuitive interpretation and the general steps to derive them for different
sharp-threshold random processes.
Equations (7a) and (7b) are tracking a prethreshold process as though the
threshold does not exist. Equation (7c) and the variable D provide a prob-
ability distribution (pdf) for the threshold time and D(t) is the cumulative
distribution of threshold time. The value of dD
dt
can be interpreted simply as
the probability density function of the random threshold. For this particular
example, D(t) possesses a closed-form solution (see Appendix Appendix B).
Equations (7d) and (7e) capture the expected trajectories that remain
prethreshold. This can be seen in two ways, first by considering the equa-
tions SP = (1−D)S and IP = (1−D)I. The factor (1−D) represents the
probability that threshold has not occurred, and only those trajectories where
threshold has not occurred stay in the prethreshold classes. The correspond-
ing derivatives in Equations (7d) and (7e) also have natural interpretations.
The first term subtracts any trajectories where threshold instantaneously
occurs. The second term dampens the rate of change, making sure it is
proportional to the trajectories where threshold has not occurred.
Equations (7f)-(7h) captures the trajectories post-threshold. The first
term represents the instantaneous inflow of new trajectories, while the sec-
ond term computes the change for the postthreshold dynamics. There is
no direct inflow of prethreshold trajectories into the RD class. Similarly,
there is no need to dampen the postthreshold changes, the second and third
terms of (7f) and (7g), as they are naturally dampened by the fact that only
the trajectories that inflow postthreshold are used to compute postthreshold
changes. The general steps to derive similar sharp threshold equations for
other systems are:
1. Write an unencumbered prethreshold system of equations. In our ex-
ample, this is Equations (7a) and (7b), and variables S and I.
2. Define a variable D to describe the cumulative distribution function of
threshold time. Its differential with respect to time is the probability
density function for the threshold time, in our example Equation (7c)
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Depending on the application, it may be easier to work with D or
dD/dt. This function may depend explicitly on t or, as in our example,
the expected prethreshold variables, SP and IP .
3. Set the expected prethreshold variables to be (1 − D) times the un-
encumbered prethreshold variables. This also defines differential equa-
tions of the expected prethreshold variables with respect to t. This is
the equivalent of Equations (7d) and (7e).
4. Write a postthreshold system of equations. Add terms of dD
dt
times the
unencumbered variables for direct inflow due to threshold occurrence.
This is the equivalent of Equations (7f)–(7h).
As we demonstrate computationally in Appendix A, these steps are nec-
essary to correctly track sharp threshold dynamics. Without a similar ap-
proach, as adding the unencumbered system and the D variable, there is
insufficient state memory to capture sharp threshold dynamics, and we see
inaccuracies in the deterministic predictions versus the expected state of the
underlying random process.
4. Application to Lanchester Equations
In this Section, we employ steps 1-4 from the previous section to develop
a novel thresholded model of combat based on Lanchester’s equations. This
model is useful both on its own as a contribution to combat models, as well
as an example of steps 1-4 in Section 3.4.
Our mathematical model considers an immediate, global loss of effective-
ness for one of the combatants. Such a loss of effectiveness may come from
the loss of a key enabler, such as communication networks, or vital asset,
and could be the result of mechanical failure or adversary action.
Lanchester [26] involves two opposing forces, which we call blue and red .
The total amount of blue forces available at time t is denoted by the variable
B(t), and the total amount of red forces available at time t is denoted by
the variable R(t). Lanchester’s aimed fire equations assume that each red
unit has a likelihood of ρ of removing a blue unit, while each blue unit has









where ρ, β are effectiveness parameters of the red (blue) sides, respectively.
These equations have been well studied and applied to numerous case studies
(see Washburn and Kress [39]). We generalize this model to consider cases
where one of the effectiveness parameters, say β is suddenly and irrevocably
reduced its prethreshold value to a lower, postthreshold value, say β−.
To create the threshold model of the Lanchester equations, we follow steps
1-4 outlined in Section 3.4.
1. We write the unencumbered prethreshold system of equations. In this
case, they are identical to Lanchester’s original formulation, Equations
(8).
2. We define a variable D(t), that describes the cumulative distribution
function of threshold time. In this example, we choose an exponentially
distributed threshold time with rate parameter λ. This gives dD(t)
dt
=
λe−λt, and D(t) = 1− e−λt, with D(0) = 0.












R + (1−D) dR
dt
.
As in our previous infection example, these equations result from set-
ting BP = (1−D)B and differentiating.





















































The required initial conditions are: B(0) and BP (0) as initial blue
forces, R(0) and RP (0) as initial red forces, and all other variables to
zero.
5. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we compare our theoretical results with simulations to
verify that the differential equations do indeed track the average state of
the underlying Markov chain. This is a critical step in verifying the differ-
ential equation models because mean-field approximations assume equality
between a random variable and its mean—and thus provide no mathematical
guarantee on the result. We do this numerical analysis and verification for
both the malware model developed in Section 3 and the Lanchester model of
Section 4. We also demonstrate that the models we develop are fundamen-
tally different than the original systems of differential equations by showing
that no parameterization of the original differential equations yields correct
behavior.
Figure 2 depicts a comparison of a simulation of cyber infection to thresh-
olded model as presented in Equations (7). Both the simulation and the
differential equations use a (β, α,m,N, µ) = (0.01; 0.99; 20; 100, 000; 0.2) and
100 initially infected machines. The dashed lines indicate the average state
of 2, 000 simulation runs; i.e., the average state of the Markov chain at time
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t, for each of the predetection and postdetection classes. The solid lines with
markers indicate the numerical integration of the differential equations. For
all pre and postdetection classes, the average of the simulation runs agrees
with the differential equations. This choice of parameterization, in partic-
ular µ = 0.2, results in highly variable postdetection classes, SD and ID.
This variance is a result of the quick adoption of the patch after detection
has occurred. The plots of SD and ID indicate a benefit of the differen-
tial equations—that they can produce the mean state of the system without
the requirement for thousands of simulations. Figure 2 depicts agreement
between the empirical distribution of detection time, derived from the simu-
lation and pictured as a histogram, versus the variable D in the differential
equation system. This demonstrates another benefit to the differential equa-
tion system: the differential equation system can produce a distribution of
threshold time even when the threshold time is a function of the system state,
as is the case for the cyber infection model.
The model described by Equations (7) split pre- and post-detection sus-
ceptibles and infecteds into different classes; however, an analyst may be
interested simply in the number of susceptibles and infecteds at time t. Fig-
ure 3 depicts a comparison between simulation and differential equations on
the number of susceptibles at time t, SP + SD, and the number of infecteds
at time t, IP + ID. The dashed lines indicate the average state of 2,000 sim-
ulation runs, and the solid marked lines indicate the result of the differential
equations. In addition, the figure includes a scatter plot for the 2,000 runs.
The variance due to the fast adoption of the patch, µ = 0.2, is evident in
the bands in the scatter plot for susceptibles. Once detection occurs, ap-
proximately 20% of machines adopt the patch in each round, resulting in the
striation in the figure. Even with this large amount of variance in the indi-
vidual simulation runs, the differential equation system accurately captures
the average state of the system.
Figure 4 depicts a comparison of a Lanchester combat model simulation to
the corresponding differential equation model as presented in Equations (9).
Both the simulations and the differential equations use a parameterization
(ρ, β, β−, λ) = (0.01, 0.02, 0.001, 1
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) and initial sizes of 100,000 for both the
blue and red forces. The differential equations agree with the mean state of
the system, except at higher values of t. This disagreement is due to the well-
known inaccuracy of the standard Lanchester aimed fire model as presented in
Equations (8) (see Washburn and Kress [39] and Taylor [36]). The standard
Lanchester model is inaccurate because it overestimates the effectiveness of
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Figure 2: Cyber infection model simulation versus differential equations. Both methods
use a parameterization of (β, α,m,N, µ) = (0.01; 0.99; 20; 100, 000; 0.2) and 100 initially
infected machines. The dashed lines indicate the average state of 2, 000 simulation runs,
and the solid lines with markers indicate the numerical integration of the differential equa-
tions. The parameter µ = 0.2 models quick adoption of the patch and results in variable
postdetection classes, SD and ID. The differential equations produce the mean state of
the system accurately, even with this variance. The top right graph depicts agreement
between the empirical distribution of detection time, derived from the simulation and pic-
tured as a histogram, versus the variable D in the differential equation system. In this
process, the detection time is a function of the system state.
Figure 3: Total susceptibles and infecteds in cyber infection model. The dashed lines
indicate the average state of 2, 000 simulation runs, and the solid marked lines indicate the
result of the differential equations, SP +SD and IP + ID. The black dots depict a scatter
plot of the state of the 2, 000 simulations. The models use the same parameterization as
in Figure 2. The striations in the scatter plot for susceptibles is due to the fast adoption
of the patch, µ = 0.2. Approximately 20% of machines adopt the patch in each round.
The differential equation system accurately captures the average state of the system.
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a large force against a small force, possibly even resulting in negative force
sizes. The crux of the matter is that the mean-field approximation in the
Lanchester model fails when the numbers become small on either side. For
large numbers of a force, say X, we may say that E[X|X > 0] ≈ E[X]. As X
becomes small, this assumption begins to fail. A solution to this difficulty is
presented by Hartley [17], where the generalized Lanchester equations have
an exponent in each variable, e.g. dR/dt = −βBCRF , and our aimed fire
example is a special case where C = 1, F = 0. Intuitively this model works
because conflict is rarely exclusively aimed or area.
Figure 5 depicts the expected size of the blue and red forces at time
t. The dashed lines depict the average of 2, 000 simulations, while the solid
marked lines depict the sums BP +BD and RP +RD. The figure also includes
a scatter plot of the states of the 2,000 simulation runs. The striations in
the scatter plot for the red forces is due to variance in the threshold time.
Before the threshold, the blue forces are highly effective against red, and after
the threshold they become ineffective. For an individual simulation, the red
forces would follow the sharp down curve, until threshold time, at which
point they would follow one of the flatter striations. Even with the highly
variable force sizes between individual simulations, Equations (9) accurately
captures the expected force sizes at time t.
Figure 6 demonstrates that our modeling method is fundamentally dif-
ferent than a simple application of previously existing models. Specifically,
consider the Lanchester threshold system, where the sharp threshold simply
reduces the effectiveness of the blue forces from β to β−. One modeling ap-
proach may be to simply replace the parameter β in the standard Lanchester
model, as presented in Equation (8), with an expected effectiveness param-
eter of the blue forces. In Figure 6, the solid lines represent the expected
size of the red and blue forces under the model presented in Equations (9),
while the dashed lines represent the closest fitting standard Lanchester model
(see Equations (8)). The best fit standard Lanchester model results from a
least-squares optimization on the parameter β, minimizing the difference
from the force sizes given by the model in Equations (9). The fit between
the closest Lanchester model and our modeling method is poor,, implying
that our approach yields fundamentally different behavior than the original
system. Appendix A demonstrates that a naive approach—one which does
not include the unencumbered system required by Step 1 in Section 3.4—to
modeling the more complex problem of cyber infections also does not work.
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Figure 4: Lanchester combat model simulation versus differential equations. Both methods
use a parameterization (ρ, β, β−, λ) = (0.01, 0.02, 0.001, 125 ) and initial sizes of 100,000 for
both forces. The standard Lanchester model has inaccuracies at high values of t that give
the disagreement between the simulations and the differential equations for the class BD
at high values of t. For small values t, less than approximately 120 in the figure, the
average state of the simulations agrees with the differential equations.
Figure 5: Total force sizes in Lanchester combat model. The dashed lines depict the
average of 2,000 simulations, while the solid marked lines depict the sums BP + BD and
RP + RD. The scatter plot depicts states of the 2,000 simulation runs. The models
use the same parameterization as Figure 4. For an individual simulation, the red forces
follow the sharp down curve, until threshold time, at which point they follow one of the
flatter striations. Even with the highly variable force sizes between individual simulations,
Equation (9) accurately captures the expected force sizes at time t.
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Figure 6: Best fit of a standard Lanchester model to a sharp threshold Lanchester model.
The solid lines represent the expected size of the red and blue forces under Equation (9),
while the dashed lines represent the closest fitting parameterization of Equation (8), a
standard Lanchester model. The best fit optimization finds the parameter β for the
standard Lanchester model that minimizes the squared error between the model’s force
sizes and Equationl (9)’s force sizes. All other parameters for both models are the same as
those in Figure 4. The fit between the closest Lanchester model and our modeling method
is poor, demonstrating that the sharp threshold models yield fundamentally new behavior.
For this example, the red forces initially diminish rapidly, but after the sharp threshold,
overwhelm the blue forces.
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6. Conclusions and Future Research
We extend the utility of differential equation models by incorporating the
novel ability to model a probabilistic sharp threshold in system dynamics.
We demonstrate our results with two applications: modeling cyber infections
and capability loss in combat—both of which are of interest in their own right.
Our cyber infection model may be useful in understanding the relative merits
of investment in additional detectors versus more rapid patch dissemination.
Similarly, we hope that our Lanchester extension will be useful in quantifying
the tradeoff between protection and attack for critical capabilities. Beyond
these two applications, we develop a simple, step-by-step procedure to model
sharp thresholds in other systems. The steps described in Section 3.4 provide
intuition and allow other modelers to create probabilistic sharp threshold
models, without re-creating the steps in Section 3.
Future areas of study that would build on this work include: (1) a broader
set of problems against which to apply our novel modeling method; (2) to
more fully develop the multiple threshold problem, and (3) to use the differ-
ential equations to describe the variance in the underlying Markov chain; the
large amount of variance is visible in the numerical analysis for both exam-
ples we consider, and it would be interesting and relevant to describe that
variance by perhaps using stochastic diffusion approaches. There has been
some work on describing the variance around mean-field models Barbour [5].
Incorporating these variance tracking techniques into the threshold models
we present may be possible, but requires significant effort beyond the scope
of our contribution. Developing a simple step-by-step process, similar as the
one we outline in the paper for sharp thresholds, for creating equations that
track the variance of the process would be of great use to practitioners.
An additional direction of future work would be to extend the techniques
in this paper to address multiple thresholds. A key consideration in multiple
thresholds is the joint distribution of the thresholds. In other words, how
does the occurrence of one threshold event effect other threshold events?
Perhaps the simplest way to start addressing this is to consider independent
thresholds, where the occurrence of one does not affect the other. One might
attempt to do multiple thresholds by a recursive application of the method
described in this paper: apply the method once for the first threshold, then
apply the method again on the resulting system for the second threshold.
Unfortunately, such a recursive application does not track the two-threshold
Markov chain well. Intuitively, the reason that the steps outlined in this
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paper work are because of the key insight to maintain the unencumbered
system. The unencumbered system allows us to track the behavior of all
Markov chain trajectories before they experience the sharp threshold. In a
two-threshold model, we have not been able to come up with an equivalent
way to track the progression of trajectories that experience one threshold
but not the other. A new insight is required to move the research forward
to multiple thresholds. This new insight should be applicable to multiple
thresholds with arbitrary joint distributions.
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Appendix A. Naive Model for Cyber Infections
A naive approach to modeling the probabilistic sharp threshold for cyber
infections ignores the unencumbered variables described in step 1 in Sec-












































The differential equations of model (A) follow from the difference equations
for the underlying Markov chain, and are natural. For example, intuitively,
Equation (A.1) says that the predetection susceptible class decreases either
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tection, which occurs instantaneously with probability − ln(α)SP IPm
N
. The
other equations of model (A) can be derived and described similarly.
Figure A.1 shows that this naive approach does not track the average
state of the underlying Markov chain. Both the simulation and model (A) are
parameterized with the same parameters as those in Figure 2. Across all state
variables, the differential equation and the simulation begin in agreement, but
later drift apart. Intuitively, this is because model (A) reaches states that
can never be reached by the simulation. An accurate model requires more
state—the unencumbered system that tracks the prethreshold progression—
and explicit modeling of the sharp threshold event—the D variable. This
intuition leads to the development of the method in Section 3, and results in
the correct model presented as Equations (7).
Figure A.1: Comparison of simulation to naive cyber infection model. These figures
parallel those of Figure 2. The simulation and the naive model, (A.1), are parameterized
in the same way as the models in Figure 2. The naive approach simply does not hold
a sufficient amount of state to accurately describe the evolution of the system. The
simulation and the naive differential equation model begin in agreement, but quickly drift
apart in all state variables.
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Appendix B. Solution of the D Equation
Equation (7c) is equivalent to
IP (t) = (1−D(t))I(t)





For details see Daley and Gani, (1999). We use the equation for I(T ) to



















which is valid because D(t) < 1 ∀t, and therefore 1−D(t) > 0. The key step
is that both sides of this equation are of the form dU/U . We let U = 1−D
and V = I0e













βNt + S0) + C.
The above expression reduces to
D = 1− κ [I0eβNt + S0] ln(α)mNβ ,
where κ = N
− ln(α)m
Nβ to ensure the initial condition D(0) = 0.
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